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FREEDOM DICTATED BY OCCUPATION?
HOW DAHLIA V. RODRIGUEZ IMPACTS
FREE SPEECH PROTECTION AFFORDED
TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Heidi Tong
I. INTRODUCTION
Burbank Police Department (BPD) officer, Angelo Dahlia,
witnessed and made several attempts to report fellow officers for
physically and verbally abusing individuals during suspect
interviews.1 Dahlia’s complaints, however, resulted only in
frustration with his supervisor’s lack of corrective action and threats
directed toward Dahlia himself.2 Dahlia reported the injustice to
BPD’s Internal Affairs.3 Immediately following Dahlia’s disclosure,
BPD placed him on administrative leave.4
Penalized for promoting BPD’s core values of respect, integrity,
and excellence,5 Dahlia filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California alleging several claims,
including retaliation against a public employee for disclosing police
misconduct—violating the First Amendment.6 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit held that Dahlia’s speech was protected.7
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1. Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1283 (2014).
2. Id. at 1064–65.
3. Id. at 1065.
4. Id.
5. See Mission Statement, BURBANK POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://www.burbankpd.org
/inside-bpd/mission-statement/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
6. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1065.
7. Id. at 1078.
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There has been a longstanding legal debate about where to draw
the line on First Amendment protection for public employees.8
Precedent dictates that public employees are not entitled to First
Amendment protection when the employees’ speech is made
pursuant to their official duties.9 However, neither the legislature nor
the courts have established a test to determine the scope of an
employee’s official duties.10 Consequently, courts have struggled
with the “official duties” rule, resulting in different approaches to
determine what constitutes official duties.11
Part II of this Comment presents the historical background of the
First Amendment’s protection for public employees. Part III
discusses the factual background of Dahlia v. Rodriguez.12 Part IV
sets forth the reasoning the court adopted in holding that the First
Amendment protected Dahlia’s speech. Part V analyzes the
implications of the court’s adoption of the chain-of-command
approach on which the Dahlia opinion relies and ultimately
concludes that the approach should be abandoned.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of Bedford13 that a mayor had the right to terminate a police
officer’s employment for expressing his political opinions.14 In doing
so, Holmes declared that “[an officer] may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman . . . [he] cannot complain, as he takes the employment on
the terms which are offered him.”15 Since this declaration, the First
Amendment’s protection, as it extends to public employees, has been
the subject of much debate and development.16
8. See id. at 1067–69.
9. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006).
10. See Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 252 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 509 (2010).
11. See id.
12. 735 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014).
13. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
14. Id. at 517–18. But see O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–
717 (1996) (“The [Supreme] Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public
employee has no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First
Amendment Rights . . . .”).
15. Id.
16. See Caroline Flynn, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue Exception to
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 MICH. L. REV. 759, 760–63 (2013).

Dahlia v. Rodriguez

2014]

11/13/2014 2:01 PM

DAHLIA V. RODRIGUEZ

1073

Following a series of landmark cases that laid the foundation of
First Amendment rights for public employees, the Supreme Court
added a significant limitation to the original two-step analysis.17 To
be protected by the First Amendment initially, public employees’
speech had to (1) address a matter of public concern and (2)
demonstrate that the employees’ interests in the speech outweighed
the employer’s administrative concerns.18 In 2006, however, Garcetti
v. Ceballos19 added an additional rule.20 Garcetti denied First
Amendment protection to a deputy district attorney who submitted to
his superior a memo explaining the inaccuracies of an affidavit.21
The Garcetti court reasoned that “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for the First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”22 By supplanting the original two-step analysis with an
additional “official duties” rule, the decision significantly diminished
the scope of protection afforded to public employees.23
In adding this new bright-line rule, however, Garcetti failed to
define the scope of the term “official duties.”24 The undefined term
resulted in lower courts applying a variety of inconsistent tests.25
Dahlia v. Rodriguez attempted to fill the void left by Garcetti by
implementing a chain-of-command approach to determine the scope
of official duties.26
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BPD assigned Dahlia to assist in the investigation of an armed
robbery at Porto’s Bakery & Café in Burbank, California on
December 28, 2007.27 Lieutenant Jon Murphy supervised the

17. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 514.
18. Id. at 511–13.
19. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
20. See id. at 421.
21. Id. at 424.
22. Id. at 421.
23. Flynn, supra note 16, at 760–61.
24. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
25. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 515–16.
26. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1283 (2014).
27. Id. at 1063.
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investigation.28 On Dahlia’s second day assisting in the investigation,
he witnessed a higher-ranked Burbank police officer, Lieutenant
Omar Rodriguez, grab one of the suspects’ throat, place the barrel of
his handgun under the suspect’s eye and state, “How does it feel to
have a gun in your face motherfucker[?]”29 That same day, Dahlia
overheard yelling and the sounds of a suspect being slapped coming
from a room where another investigator, Sergeant Edgar Penaranda,
was interviewing another suspect for the same offense.30
After Rodriguez saw the shock on Dahlia’s face, the Burbank
Officers (“Defendant Officers”) quickly proceeded to exclude Dahlia
from engaging in subsequent suspect interviews and began to take
exclusive control of the investigation.31 Prohibiting all other
personnel from walking past the interview rooms, Defendant
Officers continued to assault and beat suspects, evidenced by
booking photos of suspects.32 Dahlia reported the improper conduct
and his lack of control over the investigation to Murphy.33 Murphy
responded by instructing Dahlia to “stop his sniveling.”34 Dahlia met
with Murphy twice more after this incident, pleading for an end to
“the madness.”35 Despite Dahlia’s many complaints, Defendant
Officers continued to physically and verbally abuse suspects.36
Four months after the Porto’s investigation commenced, BDP’s
Internal Affairs decided to examine the investigation for any
unlawful physical abuse.37 Defendant Officers learned of the
impending investigation and, upon such notice, threatened Dahlia
daily to ensure that he would remain silent on the matter.38
Specifically, Defendant Officers “incessantly harassed, intimidated
and threatened Dahlia over the following weeks, to the point where
his working conditions were ‘fully consumed’ by the intimidation.”39

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1063–64.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nearly one year after the start of Defendant Officers’
misconduct, Rodriguez instructed Dahlia to enter his office, wherein
Rodriguez reached for his own gun, stared at Dahlia, and placed his
gun in a drawer.40 Rodriguez then leaned into Dahlia and said, “Fuck
with me and I will put a case on you, and put you in jail.”41 As a
result of Rodriguez’s aggressive behavior, Dahlia informed the
Burbank Police Officers’ Association (BPOA) of his encounter with
Rodriguez.42 Then, the BPOA reported it to the Burbank City
Manager.43 In a May interview with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department, Dahlia disclosed the Defendant Officers’ misconduct.44
Four days following that interview, Dahlia was placed on
administrative leave pending discipline.45
Thereafter, Dahlia filed an action against Defendant Officers
and the City of Burbank in district court, alleging several claims,
including violation of the First Amendment.46 Defendant Officers
moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.47 The district
court held that the claim was barred because the First Amendment
did not protect Dahlia’s speech.48 Dahlia appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s ruling.49
Following a majority vote of eligible judges, the Ninth Circuit
reheard the case en banc.50
IV. THE REASONING OF THE COURT
On appeal, Defendant Officers relied on Huppert v. City of
Pittsburg,51 which held that police officers’ official duties included
reporting police misconduct.52 Based on Huppert, Defendant
Officers argued that Dahlia acted within his official duties and
therefore was not protected by the First Amendment.53 Dahlia
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id.
Id.
574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 707.
See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1071.
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counter-argued that to remain consistent with the principles set forth
in Garcetti, the court would have to overrule Huppert and deem
Dahlia’s speech protected by the First Amendment.54 Dahlia asserted
that under Garcetti’s official duties rule, Dahlia’s speech fell outside
of the realm of his official duties as a police officer and thus
deserved First Amendment protection.55
The court agreed with Dahlia and overruled Huppert to abide by
Garcetti’s official duties rule.56 Furthermore, the court established
factors to determine the scope of an employee’s official duties.57
These factors are: (1) whether the employee communicated with
individuals outside his chain of command, (2) the subject matter of
the communication, and (3) whether the employee was speaking in
direct contravention to his supervisor’s orders.58
Based on these factors, the court found that, construing the
complaint in Dahlia’s favor, Dahlia’s speech fell outside of the scope
of official duties and therefore merited First Amendment
protection.59 The court subsequently decided that Dahlia sufficiently
stated a claim, and reversed the district court’s ruling.60 The Ninth
Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
findings.61
The Ninth Circuit first looked to the analysis set forth in
Garcetti to determine whether the First Amendment protected
Dahlia’s speech.62 The Court in Garcetti held that the First
Amendment does not protect statements made pursuant to an
officer’s official duties.63 Although Garcetti rejected broad job
descriptions and mandated a fact-specific inquiry to determine the
scope of official duties, it did not provide a specific test.64

54. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 10-55978 Dahlia v. Rodriguez,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BTiSKFx5_98.
55. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1077.
56. Id. at 1063.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. Id. at 1074–75.
59. Id. at 1077–78.
60. Id. at 1080.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1068.
63. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
64. See id. at 424; see Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1068–69.
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Accordingly, the court referred to Huppert to define the scope of
official duties.65 Employed as an officer of the Pittsburg Police
Department (PPD), Ron Huppert was subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury investigating corruption within the PPD.66 The court in
Huppert found that officers were acting pursuant to their official
duties by investigating and reporting police corruption.67 The
Huppert court relied on Christal v. Police Commission of City and
County of San Francisco68 as a shortcut to automatically classify
whistleblowing as part of an officer’s official duties.69
Huppert followed Christal’s sweeping, generalized definition to
determine the scope an officer’s official duties rather than
conducting Garcetti’s fact-specific inquiry.70 Dahlia determined that
Huppert incorrectly relied on the general job description in Christal,
which stated that an officer’s official duties included the duty to
“testify freely” concerning facts before a grand jury.71 Distinguishing
Christal from Huppert, Dahlia stated that Christal was solely limited
to whether police officers “could assert their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and still remain police officers.”72 Unlike
Christal, which concerned a Fifth Amendment claim, Huppert
concerned a First Amendment claim.73 Consequently, Dahlia
overruled Huppert for improperly relying on Christal.74
Left without Huppert’s definition of official duties, the court set
forth the three aforementioned factors, consisting of whether the
communication fell outside the chain of command, the subject matter
of the communication, and whether the communication was a
contravention of orders. The court examined these three factors to
determine whether Dahlia’s speech fell within the scope of an
officer’s official duties.75

65. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1069–70.
66. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 698–701 (9th Cir. 2009).
67. Leslie Pope, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of Police Officers’
Subpoenaed Testimony After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 YALE L.J. 2143, 2143–44 (2010).
68. 92 P.2d 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
69. Id. at 419; Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1070.
70. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1070–71.
71. Id.; Christal, 92 P.2d at 419.
72. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1071.
73. Id. at 1070–71.
74. Id. at 1071.
75. Id. at 1074–75.
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The Ninth Circuit determined that the first factor, whether the
employee communicated with individuals outside his chain of
command, weighed in Dahlia’s favor.76 By speaking to BPD’s
Internal Affairs officers, Dahlia communicated outside of his chain
of command.77 The majority determined that “it [was] reasonable to
infer that Dahlia did not have a duty to report threats to his union . . .
clearly [speaking] outside the chain of command.”78 The court stated
that this chain-of-command factor was “a relevant, if not necessarily
dispositive, factor in determining whether he spoke pursuant to his
official duties.”79 Consequently, the court abstained from analyzing
the second and third factors.80 The court held that, construing the
complaint in favor of Dahlia, his speech was protected, and the court
reversed both the district court’s and three judge panel’s ruling.81
V. ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION
OF THE CHAIN-OF-COMMAND ANALYSIS
While Garcetti held that a public employee’s speech would not
be protected if the speech was made pursuant to the employee’s
official duties, it left the determination of the scope of official duties
to the lower courts.82 The Dahlia court attempted to clarify Garcetti
by providing three factors to determine the scope of official duties.83
Of these factors, the court focused its analysis on the first factor and
adopted a “de facto” chain-of-command approach.84 Although
Dahlia’s speech was protected, this was the result of his reporting to
an outside agency.85 Many misconduct reports, however, may likely
be conveyed to a direct supervisor and consequently will be subject
to First Amendment limitations. Accordingly, this approach
represents a misapplication of Garcetti that undercuts the principles
Garcetti sought to implement.86 As evidenced by other courts’ use of

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1077–78.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1074.
See id. at 1077–78.
Id. at 1080.
Wiese, supra note 10, at 509.
See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074–76.
Id. at 1074–78.
Id. at 1077–78.
Id. at 1080–83 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
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alternative approaches,87 the weight that the Dahlia court bestowed
on an employee’s communication, or lack thereof, with individuals
within the chain of command presents significant consequences and
complications for public employees, as well as the lower courts.
A. The Chain-of-Command Analysis Undermines
the Principles Set Forth in Garcetti
The objective of the Garcetti decision is to ensure that courts
balance deference to government employers’ daily operations, while
still providing an individual citizen a platform to speak out on
matters of public concern.88 Due to the nature of the trusted positions
public employees frequently hold, employees who enter into public
employment are subject to more limitations on their First
Amendment rights.89 By adopting the chain-of-command approach,
the court in Dahlia thwarts the main balancing objective set forth in
Garcetti.
The controlling rationale behind public employees being subject
to more limitations on their First Amendment rights is government
efficiency.90 Without some degree of control over their employees,
government employers are unable to provide citizens with efficient
public services.91 Public employees often occupy trusted positions in
the community.92 In such trusted positions, there is a concern that a
public employee may voice an opinion that could encroach on
government policies or impair government functions if given
unlimited First Amendment protection.93 This does not, however,
completely bar public employees from civic discourse. Rather,
Garcetti simply does not grant public employees “a right to perform
their jobs however they see fit.”94
Nevertheless, a criticism of this policy is that prohibiting public
employees from speaking on matters of public concern deprives
citizens of informed opinions on such matters.95 Public employees
87. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 515–16; see also Flynn, supra note 16, at 771 (discussing
the different approaches courts have used to evaluate public employees’ First Amendment rights).
88. Flynn, supra note 16, at 767–68.
89. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 418.
92. Id. at 419.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 422.
95. Id. at 420 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004)).
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are frequently in “the best position to know what ails the agencies for
which they work” and are best able to utilize their informed opinions
to contribute significantly to public debates.96 As such, courts are
placed in a delicate yet essential position to strike a balance between
promoting both individual and societal interests served by a public
employee’s free speech.97
Taking these two adverse interests into account, the emphasis
that the Ninth Circuit placed on the chain-of-command analysis
undermines Garcetti’s underlying rationale of government
efficiency. Garcetti implemented restrictions on public employees’
First Amendment protection to promote efficiency of government
services, while still affording public employees a right to engage in
civic discourse.98 Dahlia’s chain-of-command analysis, however,
runs counter to these goals.
The Dahlia court failed to consider that in order to promote the
aims of Garcetti, it benefits both the government and society to allow
employees to report up the chain of command, without fear of being
subject to retaliation.99 First, public employees’ communication with
their supervisors promotes efficiency.100 Presumably, a supervisor is
in the best position to know the information and subsequent actions
necessary to resolve any issue brought to his or her attention.101
Involving multiple outside parties to avoid reporting up the chain of
command may only serve to confuse or distort the situation at
hand.102 Disclosure to a supervisor keeps the conflict within the
agency.103
Second, a government employee’s ability to disclose potential
misconduct to his superiors strengthens the public’s confidence in
law enforcement.104 Without this freedom, the public may think that
96. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994).
97. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420.
98. Id.
99. See Garcetti 547 U.S. at 427–29 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674
(emphasizing the benefits to society and government agencies of First Amendment protection for
public employees).
100. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wiese, supra note 10, at
528 (discussing why public employees’ communication with supervisors promotes efficiency).
101. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wiese, supra note 10, at
528 (discussing why public employees’ communication with supervisors promotes efficiency).
102. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 528.
103. See id.
104. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014).
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officers are simply turning their heads to ongoing police
corruption.105 An officer’s ability to report police misconduct
without fear significantly diminishes the chance that the public will
perceive law enforcement as a corrupt agency.106
With these policies in mind, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion undermines the principles that Garcetti sets forth.107 Rather
than incentivizing and promoting government efficiency and societal
interests, the majority opinion traps officers in a catch-22—either
violate their duty to report to their supervisors and receive First
Amendment protection, or adhere to their duty and expose
themselves to employment retaliation.108 Indeed, as a result of
Dahlia, officers who find themselves in a position akin to Dahlia’s
will be forced to choose between sacrificing the public interest and
work efficiency (by not reporting up their chain of command), or
adhering to their duty and risking employer retaliation.109 The court
has essentially asked officers to choose between the public interest
and their own self-interest.110 In sum, it is this predicament in which
an officer may find himself that warrants abandoning the
chain-of-command analysis.
B. Alternative Methods to the
Chain-of-Command Analysis
Other circuits’ decisions to refrain from adopting the
chain-of-command approach evidences that others view the law and
policy advanced by Dahlia negatively.111 Consequently, courts have
adopted other approaches, such as the civilian-analogue exception
and the assigned-responsibilities approach.112
1. The Civilian-Analogue Exception
One alternative to the chain-of-command approach is the
civilian-analogue exception.113 Under this exception, a public
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1083.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1082–83.
110. See id.
111. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 519 & n.96; see also Flynn, supra note 16, at 772
(discussing the Second Circuit’s adoption of the Civilian Analogue Approach).
112. Wiese, supra note 10, at 519; Flynn, supra note 16, at 772.
113. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241–42 (2d Cir. 2011); Flynn, supra note 16, at 772.
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employee’s act is protected if a civilian would be able to perform the
same act.114 In Jackler v. Byrne,115 the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff’s refusal to comply with orders to issue false statements to
hide police misconduct had a civilian analogue.116 The court
reasoned that any citizen could report a police officer.117 Even
though the officer’s actions were part of his official duties, there was
a civilian analogue, and thus, his actions warranted First Amendment
protection.118
There is an argument, however, that when an “employee speaks
as an employee, ‘there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens
who are not government employees,’ and thus normal First
Amendment protections for citizens should not apply.”119 Therefore,
Jackler’s civilian-analogue exception is not without its faults, and
only one of the many alternatives courts have implemented.
2. The Assigned-Responsibilities Approach
Other courts, including those in the Ninth Circuit, have adopted
the assigned-responsibilities approach to define the scope of a public
employee’s official duties.120 Using this approach, courts examine
whether the employee was required to engage in speech as part of his
official duties.121
For example, Marable v. Nitchman122 focused its analysis on the
assigned responsibilities of the employee.123 Marable was an
engineer for Washington State Ferries and began witnessing
allegedly “corrupt financial schemes.”124 Consequently, Marable
reported the misconduct to the Chief Executive Officer, the
Department of Transportation auditor, the State Executive Ethics
Board, and his supervisor.125 The Marable court concluded “that
Marable had no official duty to ensure that his supervisors were

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Flynn, supra note 16, at 774–75.
658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011).
Flynn, supra note 16, at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Wiese, supra note 10, at 515 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)).
Id. at 519–20.
See Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007).
511 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 932–33.
Id. at 926, 933.
Wiese, supra note 10, at 520.

Dahlia v. Rodriguez

2014]

11/13/2014 2:01 PM

DAHLIA V. RODRIGUEZ

1083

refraining from the alleged corrupt practices.”126 Thus, the court
rejected defendant Nitchman’s motion for summary judgment,
stating that the speech was not part of Marable’s official duties.127
The Marable court’s decision contrasts with the decision in
Freitag v. Ayeres.128 Freitag was a correctional officer for the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
who had witnessed inmates engaging in inappropriate sexual
exhibitionist acts.129 In response, Freitag submitted several internal
reports, disciplinary reports, and various other documents to CDCR
officials, the California State Senator, and the California Office of
the Inspector General.130 The Freitag court determined that the
internal reports to CDCR officials were “pursuant to [Freitag’s]
duties as a correctional officer and thus not in her capacity as a
citizen.”131 The court determined that her communications to the
Senator and Inspector General, however, were protected because
Freitag was not acting in her official capacity in making these
communications.132
Both courts in Marable and Freitag implemented the
assigned-responsibilities analysis.133 Rather than looking to whom
the speech was directed, this alternative approach asks the questions:
“What are the responsibilities that correspond to this plaintiff’s
position, and can the communication be considered part of these
responsibilities?”134 While the result in Freitag would have been the
same if the court had applied a chain-of-command analysis, Marable
would have resulted in the opposite outcome. Marable’s
communication to the Chief Executive Officer would have been
within Marable’s chain of command, and thus, would not have been
protected. Prohibiting an engineer like Marable from speaking to his
superior about finances, a subject completely detached from his
actual work responsibilities, runs counter to Garcetti’s principles.
126. Marable, 511 F.3d at 933.
127. Id. at 926, 932–33.
128. Compare id. at 929, 932 (holding that a defendant’s internal reports of misconduct was
outside scope of official duties), with Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a defendant’s internal reports of misconduct was within scope of official duties).
129. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 532–34.
130. Id. at 532–35.
131. Id. at 546.
132. Id. at 545–46.
133. Wiese, supra note 10, at 520–21.
134. See id. at 521.

Dahlia v. Rodriguez

1084

11/13/2014 2:01 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1071

Thus, the chain-of-command approach should not be as dispositive
as the Dahlia court suggested.
C. The Chain-of-Command Analysis Could
Lead To Inconsistent Results
for Different Public Employees
Dahlia’s chain-of-command analysis presents further
implications if this approach is applied to public employees who,
unlike police officers, may not have a distinct hierarchical
employment structure.
While most employees do have supervisors, the structure of the
police department consists of direct rankings in a military-like
fashion, each officer knowing who is above and below him.135
Teachers, in contrast, are employed within a much less distinct
hierarchy.136 Several teachers report to one principal. Possibly
excluded from this two-tier hierarchy are administration staff,
educational support, and other ad hoc committees.137 Thus, a
question becomes immediately apparent: what happens when a
teacher reports misconduct to someone other than the principal? Do
members of an ad hoc committee or administrative staff constitute
individuals within the teacher’s chain of command?
This wrinkle in the chain-of-command analysis creates an unfair
advantage to public employees who do not have a strict vertical
hierarchy. If personnel other than the principal, such as an ad hoc
committee member, were labeled as outside the chain of command,
teachers would be more likely to encounter someone not within the
chain of command. This would result in varying degrees of
protection for different types of public employees.
Rather than have an individual’s occupation determine the
limitations on his or her First Amendment protection, it is better
policy to give all public employees the same quality of protection.
Allowing certain employment fields to have more First Amendment
limitations may deter individuals from entering those employment
135. See The LAPD Career Ladder, JOINLAPD, http://joinlapd.com/career_ladder.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2014).
136. Cf. Nirav S., What Are Hierarchies in the School System? PRESERVE ARTICLES, http://
www.preservearticles.com/2012011120547/what-are-hierarchies-in-the-school-system.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating schools comprise of different available positions depending on each
school’s unique needs and employ contrasting models of hierarchies).
137. See id.
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fields for fear of being retaliated against. Additionally, the lack of a
specific test to determine who is within a public employee’s chain of
command leaves this uncharted territory to the discretion of lower
courts. This absence could lead to courts’ conflicting views about
who is within an employee’s chain of command. The anticipated
possibility of inconsistent and uncertain applications of the
chain-of-command analysis thus warrants the disposal of the
chain-of-command approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rather than utilizing the chain-of-command approach, the court
could have simply found guidance in Garcetti’s statement that
official duties are tasks that an “employee actually is expected to
perform.”138 Even if a public employee is expected to report up his
chain of command, he is not expected to contradict his supervisor’s
orders. Accordingly, because Dahlia spoke in direct opposition to his
instructions, Garcetti’s “expected to perform” statement alone
suggests that Dahlia’s speech does not fall within his official duties.
Therefore, Dahlia’s speech warranted protection under the First
Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the chain-of-command approach
not only undercuts the principles set forth by Garcetti but also
presents significant implications for future applications and public
employees’ constitutional rights. For these reasons, the chain-ofcommand approach should be abandoned.

138. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006).
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